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The most common authentication mechanism for user to operating system is a password, a "word" known to computer and user. Although password protection seems to offer a relatively secure system, human practice sometimes degrades its quality.


[edit] Use of Passwords

The use of passwords is fairly straightforward. A user enters some piece of identification, such as a name or an assigned user ID; this identification can be available to the public or easy to guess because it does not provide the real security of the system. The system then requests a password from the user. If the password matches that on file for the user, the user is authenticated and allowed access to the system. If the password match fails, the system requests the password again, in case the user mistyped.

In addition to the name and password, we can use other information available to authenticate users by utilizing:

[edit] Loose-Lipped Systems

The system should notify a user of a failure only after accepting both the user name and the password. The failure message should not indicate whether it is the user name or password that is unacceptable. This prevents intruder from gaining clues on valid usernames. Loose-Lipped Systems provide detailed information about which point of authentication flow failed.

[edit] Attacks on Passwords

Passwords are somewhat limited as protection devices because of the relatively small number of bits of information they contain. Here are some ways you might be able to determine a user's password:

[edit] Brute Force Attack

In brute force attack, the attacker tries all possible passwords, usually in some automated fashion. Searching for a single particular password does not necessarily require all passwords to be tried; an intruder needs to try only until the correct password is identified. If the set of all possible passwords were evenly distributed, an intruder would likely need to try only half of the password space: the expected number of searches to find any particular password. However, an intruder can also use to advantage the fact that passwords are not evenly distributed. Because a password has to be remembered, people tend to pick simple passwords. This feature reduces the size of the password space.

[edit] Dictionary Attack

People tend to choose names or words they can remember. Many computing systems have spelling checkers that can be used to check for spelling errors and typographic mistakes in documents. These spelling checkers sometimes carry online dictionaries of the most common English words. One contains a dictionary of 80,000 words. Trying all of these words as passwords takes only 80 seconds.

[edit] Passwords Likely for a User

People typically choose personal passwords, such as the name of a spouse, a child, a brother or sister, a pet, a street name, or something memorable or familiar. If we restrict our password attempts to just names of people (first names), streets, projects, and so forth, we generate a list of only a few hundred possibilities at most. Trying this number of passwords takes under a second! Even a person working by hand could try ten likely candidates in a minute or two.

Several network sites post dictionaries of phrases, science fiction characters, places, mythological names, Chinese words, Yiddish words, and other specialized lists. All these lists are posted to help site administrators identify users who have chosen weak passwords, but the same dictionaries can also be used by attackers of sites that do not have such attentive administrators.

[edit] Automated Password Guessing

Here are the password guessing steps:

[edit] System Password File

To validate passwords, the system must have a way of comparing entries with actual passwords. Rather than trying to guess a user's password, an attacker may instead target the system password file.

On some systems, the password list is a file, organized essentially as a two-column table of user IDs and corresponding passwords. This information is certainly too obvious to leave out in the open. Various security approaches are used to conceal this table from those who should not see it.

You might protect the table with strong access controls, limiting access to the operating system. The operating system is not divided, so all its modules have access to all privileged information. This monolithic view of the operating system implies that a user who exploits a flaw in one section of the operating system has access to all the system's deepest secrets.

If the table is stored in plain sight, an intruder can simply dump memory at a convenient time to access it. Careful timing may enable a user to dump the contents of all of memory and, by exhaustive search, find values that look like the password table.

System backups can also be used to obtain the password table. To be able to recover from system errors, system administrators periodically back up the file space onto some auxiliary medium for safe storage. If a regular user can access the backups, even ones from several weeks, months, or years ago, the password tables stored in them may contain entries that are still valid.

Finally, the password file is a copy of a file stored on disk. Anyone with access to the disk or anyone who can overcome file access restrictions can obtain the password file.

[edit] Encrypted Password File

Frequently, the password list is hidden from view with conventional encryption or one-way ciphers. With conventional encryption, either the entire password table is encrypted or just the password column. When a user's password is received, the stored password is decrypted, and the two are compared.

Even with encryption, there is still a slight exposure because for an instant the user's password is available in plaintext in main memory. That is, the password is available to anyone who could obtain access to all of memory.

A safer approach uses one-way encryption. The password table's entries are encrypted by a one-way encryption and then stored. When the user enters a password, it is also encrypted and then compared with the table. If the two values are equal, the authentication succeeds. Of course, the encryption has to be such that it is unlikely that two passwords would encrypt to the same ciphertext, but this characteristic is true for most secure encryption algorithms.

With one-way encryption, the password file can be stored in plain view. For example, the password table for the Unix operating system can be read by any user, unless special access controls have been installed. This however introduces a new problem of attackers brute-forcing the actual password file to find weak passwords.

Modern Unix operating systems store password files with tight access controls to prevent non-authorized users from reading it.

[edit] Social Engineering

Guessing passwords and breaking encryption can be tedious or daunting. But there is a simple way to obtain a password: Get it directly from the user! People often tape a password to the side of a terminal, or write it on a card just inside the top desk drawer. Users are afraid they will forget their passwords, or they cannot be bothered trying to remember them. It is particularly tempting to write the passwords down when users have several accounts. Users sharing work or data may also be tempted to share passwords. If someone needs a file, it is easier to say "my password is x; get the file yourself" than to arrange to share the file.

[edit] Password Selection Criteria

Below are several guidelines for password selection:

[edit] See Also

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This page has been accessed 2,870 times. This page was last modified on 21 June 2007, at 21:49.


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